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POPULATION BASICS
At its simplest, there are only three factors which bring
about population change: births (fertility), deaths
(mortality) and movement (migration). The complex
interaction between these three elements gives rise to all of
the possible variations within a population, among them
the popular concepts of ‘baby boom’, ‘brain drain’ and the
rise of the ‘grey consumer’, where older people have
disposable income to spend on goods and services
particularly relating to health and leisure.
Typically, demographic variables are expressed as rates. A
rate is a measure that reflects the frequency of an event
(such as birth), relative to the population that may
experience that event. Rates are useful because they allow
us to make comparisons between different populations
and because they can be compared across time to discover
trends in a particular population. For example, Ireland and
India have very different population sizes (4.4 million in
Ireland compared to 1,132 million in India), but we can
directly compare the birth rates for the two countries.
Ireland’s birth rate is 15 births per 1,000 people, while India’s
birth rate is considerably higher at 24 births per 1,000
people. We can also see how Ireland’s birth rate has
changed over time. In 1980, it was 21.8 births per 1,000, so it
has dropped significantly over the last quarter of a century.
In exploring Europe’s current population experience, the
key basic measures to be used are the crude birth rate,
crude death rate, net migration rate and total fertility rate,
along with the percentage of the population falling within
different age bands. These are explained further in Box 1.
Box 1: Population Measurements
The crude birth rate (often referred to simply as
the birth rate) is the most commonly used index of
fertility. This is the ratio of the number of live births
each year to the total population (usually
measured at the mid-point of the year).It is
expressed as the number of births per 1,000
population. e.g. if 3,000 babies were born in a
population of 150,000, then the crude birth rate
would be 20 per 1,000.
The crude death rate is the number of deaths per
1,000 members of a given population. It may be
calculated for the population at the mid-point of
the year or at the beginning of the year.
Natural increase is a simple measure of
population growth which examines the differences
between births (fertility) and deaths (mortality) in
a given group. It is usually determined by
subtracting the crude death rate from the crude
birth rate. Natural increase is generally expressed
as a percentage figure. e.g. an annual natural
increase of 0.8 means that a country is increasing
its population by 0.8 per cent each year. For
example, Croatia and Ireland have about the same
population total, at 4.4 million, but in Croatia the
death rate (12 per 1,000) is higher than the birth
rate (10 per 1,000) whereas in Ireland the birth rate
(15 per 1,000) is higher than the death rate (7 per
1,000), which means that we can say that Croatia’s
total population will fall, while Ireland’s will rise, if
we ignore the possible impact of migration.
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Total Fertility Rate: The single most important
factor in determining future population is the
total fertility rate (TFR).The TFR is defined as the
average number of babies born to women during
their reproductive years. A TFR of 2.1 is considered
the replacement rate; once the TFR of a
population reaches 2.1 the population will remain
stable assuming no immigration or emigration
takes place. The TFR is one of the most useful
indicators of fertility because it gives the best
picture of how many children women are
currently having.
Population Structure: In addition to the aspects
outlined above, another factor that contributes to
overall population change is the structure of a
population. If we look at the profile of a country in
terms of its population’s age and sex structure, we
will be able to determine whether a country has
an expanding, declining or stable population. The
population pyramid is a visually striking
representation of the age and sex structure of a
population. To make up a pyramid, a population is
classified into age groups (cohorts) and by gender
(male/female).The actual number of people, or
sometimes the percentage of a population that
falls into each of these age categories, is then
graphed. The percentage of males in specific age
groups is shown on the left and the percentage of
females on the right. The general shape of the
graph indicates the relative growth of the
population (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Current Population Structure of EU-27.
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Source: compiled by R. McManus, based on data from the
World Population Data Sheet 2007.
Figure 1: Projected European Population, 2007-2050
Figure 3: Total Fertility Rates in Selected European
Countries, 2007
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EUROPEAN POPULATION
OVERVIEW
According to the 2007 World Population Data Sheet, the
forty-four countries of Europe have a total population of 733
million, which is projected to fall to 719 million by mid-2025
and to 669 million by mid-2050, representing a projected
drop of 9% in total population to 2050 (Figure 1).The
population of the 27 countries of the European Union (EU-
27) is also projected to fall over the same period, although
not quite as dramatically. This is largely due to a negative
rate of natural increase, with deaths exceeding births for
the region as a whole (also termed natural
decrease).Meanwhile, the total fertility rate, at 1.5 children
per woman, is well below the replacement level (2.1) (see
Figure 3). Despite the expectation that there will be some
movement of people into Europe, the net migration rate is
not expected to make up for this imbalance.
Why is the population of Europe
expected to decline?
Europe is experiencing a phenomenon known as
population ageing (or demographic ageing). This is where
the overall age structure of the entire population changes,
with the older age groups increasing relative to the younger
age groups. As a result, the average age of the population as
a whole is increasing. There are two causes of demographic
ageing, which can occur individually or simultaneously. The
first of these is fertility decline, which is also sometimes
termed bottom-up ageing (as it reflects a change to the
bottom of the population pyramid). This is where declining
birth rates result in fewer children being born. This means
that the population aged over 60 years will comprise a
greater proportion of the total population. 
The second type of ageing occurs due to declining
mortality in the older age groups, as life expectancy
increases, leading to ‘top-down’ ageing where there are
more people at the apex of the population pyramid. These
changes typically reflect improved living standards and
health care (see Box 2). Current projections suggest that in
2030 the proportion of the population aged over 65 in the
EU-25 (i.e. the EU countries excluding Romania and
Bulgaria, which joined in 2007) could reach 24.7% (from
16.6% in 2005), with 7.2% aged over 80 (from 4.1% in 2005). 
Both processes of demographic ageing have affected the
European population, so that Europe already has 19 of the
World’s 20 oldest countries in terms of population age, a
trend which is set to continue over the next 25 years (Lutz,
2006). Although Europe and Japan led the way in terms of
population ageing, it is worth noting that this phenomenon
is now occurring worldwide (PRB, 2007). Globally, some 7%
of the population is now made up of people aged 65 and
over. This proportion is projected to increase to 10% by 2025
and to 16% by 2050. While the industrialized countries are
ahead, it is predicted that some 15% of the population in
developing countries will be aged 65 or over by 2050,
reaching 19% in Latin America and 18% in Asia. 
Naturally, the different rates of fertility decline and life
expectancy between various countries have resulted in an
uneven distribution of the aged population. European
countries with over 17% of their populations aged over 65
(i.e. an above average proportion) include Italy, Germany,
Belgium, Greece and Sweden. By contrast, Ireland has had
a very different demographic experience. In the period
from the 1840s to the 1950s, there were low marriage rates,
a late age of marriage, high rates of fertility within marriage
and high rates of emigration from Ireland (Kennedy, 1973).
This contrasts strongly with the post-World War II European
experience, where there was a rapid recovery to historically
high marriage rates, falling fertility rates within marriage
and rising levels of births outside marriage, and the
development of large-scale immigration in a number of
European societies (MacEinri, 1997). It was not until the
1980s that fertility rates in Ireland began to fall towards
European averages. Nevertheless, this delay in the fertility
decline, combined with immigration during the 1990s, has
left Ireland with an exceptionally young population, so it is
the least affected by the ageing process and has the lowest
proportion of elderly of all EU member states (Lutz, 2006).
Box 2: Life Expectancy and
Mortality
Life Expectancy is a hypothetical measure which
provides an estimate of the average number of
additional years a person could expect to live if the
age-specific death rates for a given year prevailed
for the rest of his or her life. It is based on current
death rates and, because actual death rates change
over the course of a person’s lifetime, each person’s
life expectancy changes over time.
As infant mortality declined significantly in the
20th century, life expectancy worldwide increased
dramatically. The United Nations estimated that in
the 1950s the world life expectancy rate at birth
was 46.4 years, with the developed regions having
a life expectancy of 66.0 years and less developed
regions having a life expectancy of only 40.7 years. 
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By 2007, world life expectancy had increased to
68.0 years with more developed regions increasing
to an average of 77.0 years and less developed
regions increasing to 66.0 years. That represents an
increase in life expectancy of close to 47% for the
world, and a 62% increase for the less developed
regions. 
Despite these improvements, there are still stark
contrasts evident. For example, Sweden’s infant
mortality rate is 2.8 (infant deaths per 1,000 live
births) compared to 100 in Zambia. Not
surprisingly, average life expectancy at birth in
Sweden is 81 years, compared with just 38 years in
Zambia.
In Ireland, life expectancy at birth was 80.52 years
for females born in 2006, compared to just 57.9 for
those born in 1926. Males born in 2006 could
expect to live for 75.11 years, compared to 57.4 years
for those born in 1926.
CHANGING FERTILITY
PATTERNS
When the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, giving birth to
the European Union, every one of the 27 countries that are
now EU member states had total fertility rates above 2.1 (i.e.
replacement level, the point at which population stabilises).
Now, none does (Johnson, 2007). This is a startling statistic,
but what does it mean?
Fertility, relating to the number of children born, involves
both a biological and a social component. The biological
aspect refers to the physical capacity to reproduce.
However, it is the social environment which has had the
greatest impact on the number of children being born.
Significant changes have taken place in fertility patterns
since World War II, which have been explained in a variety
of ways (see Box 3), largely relating to societal changes,
linked to the widespread availability of reliable methods of
birth control from the mid-1960s. The overall decline in
birth rates has been described as the fertility transition.
The fertility transition, involving a shift from high to low
fertility (associated with a move from ‘natural’ fertility to
fertility limitation) is one aspect of the demographic
transition model, which also involves a shift from high to
low mortality (Weeks, 1999). 
Box 3: Some factors affecting
fertility patterns
• age structure
• income, wealth and prestige, value of family 
allowances
• religious observance 
• education
• attitudes to family size and birth control
• concern with material possessions/consumerism
• changing status of women, and their changing 
role in society and economy
(see Hall, 1995, for further discussion)
Changing fertility patterns are related to different aspects of
social and economic geography, and the interrelations
between the various components and processes of social
and demographic change are complex. Some factors which
may have led to declining fertility include increasing
urbanisation, the evolving status of women and a move
from religious observance to increasing consumerism. In
traditional rural societies, large families were prized
because they could supply farm labour and security for
parents in their old age. These influences, which continue
to encourage large family size in the developing world, have
largely disappeared in Europe, as agriculture has become
mechanised and the population has become
predominantly urban. Another key reason for the tendency
to have large families was the high infant mortality rate,
which led to parents having more children as an ‘insurance
policy’, given the likelihood that many would die before
reaching adulthood. This has also declined significantly
since the second half of the twentieth century (see Box 2
above). In contemporary Europe, the perceived role of the
family has changed for urban couples, who may make
‘trade-offs’ between quality of life and the expense of having
children. Personal fulfilment is increasingly linked to
material objectives in a consumer society, in contrast to the
past, when strict adherence to religious traditions which
prohibited artificial means of family limitation tended to
encourage large families. As women have become
increasingly well educated and are more likely to have a
career outside the home, motherhood is just one of many
possible roles. For example, Ireland’s 2006 census showed
that almost 53% of all women aged over 15 are in paid
employment, compared to just 36% in 1980 (OECD, 1980). 
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The Council of Europe view is that ‘the principal factors
responsible for falling fertility are modernisation and
individualisation as well as the desire to study, pursue a
career and achieve a certain standard of living before
starting a family. Life in large towns and cities and a decline
in religious beliefs are further contributory factors to this fall
in the number of children’ (Höhn, 2005).
EUROPE’S GEOGRAPHY OF
NATURAL DECREASE
Many European populations are experiencing more deaths
than births annually, a phenomenon that is not occurring in
any other world region. Across Europe as a whole (as
defined by the PRB, 2007), there are 10 births per
1,000 people, compared to 11 deaths. The
situation is most stark in Eastern Europe, where
the birth rate stands at 10 per 1,000, while the
death rate has reached 14 per 1,000. This
phenomenon of natural decrease, when
combined with current levels of migration,
suggests that the population of Eastern Europe
will fall by more than one-fifth between 2007 and
2050, from 271 million to 229 million. The largest
gaps between birth rates and death rates are
currently being experienced in Ukraine, followed
by Russia, Belarus and Bulgaria (see Table 1, which
shows those countries which are projected to
lose 20% or more of their population by 2050).
The greatest projected population change from
2007 to 2050 will be in EU-member state
Bulgaria, which is expected to experience a drop
of 35% in its population.
Figure 4: Total Fertility Rate in EU-25, 1960-2005
Source: Eurostat Regional Yearbook 2007: 17
Table 1: Population Change for selected European Countries, 2007-2050
Projected   
Population Births per Deaths per Rate of  Net Projected Population 
mid-2007 1,000 1,000 Natural Migration Rate Population (millions) Change  
(millions) Population Population Increase (%) per 1,000 mid–2050 2007–2050 (%)
EUROPE 733 10 11 -0.1 2 669 -9
Bulgaria 7.7 10 15 -0.5 0 5 -35
Ukraine 46.5 10 16 -0.6 0 33.4 -28
Moldova 4 11 12 -0.2 1 3 -24
Estonia 1.3 11 13 -0.2 0 1 -23
Russia 141.7 10 15 -0.5 2 109.4 -23
Latvia 2.3 10 14 -0.5 -1 1.8 -22
Romania 21.6 10 12 -0.2 0 17.1 -21
Belarus 9.7 9 14 -0.5 0 7.8 -20
Poland 38.1 10 10 0 -1 30.5 -20
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.8 9 9 0 0 3.1 -20
Malta 0.4 10 8 0.2 2 0.3 -20
Source: World Population Data Sheet 2007
GEOGRAPHICAL VIEWPOINT • VOL. 35 • 2007
PAGE 54
Although the trends which have given rise to the fertility
decline, as discussed above, have been broadly similar in all
rich countries, this fertility transition occurred at different
speeds in different parts of Europe. A gradual and
consistent fertility decline was experienced in Scandinavia
and north-west Europe, whereas in the European countries
of the Mediterranean and central and eastern Europe, the
pace and rate of change was more intermittent. Strong
family traditions in the Mediterranean region, boosted by
military dictatorships and the Catholic church, slowed
down the transition after World War II, as marriage and
children were encouraged, while women working outside
the home and children being born out of wedlock were
frowned upon. When the change in fertility happened, it
occurred very rapidly. Meanwhile, in central and eastern
Europe under Communism, women working outside the
home, free child care and higher salaries for parents with
larger families were the norm. Following the collapse of
Communism, such policies disappeared, while economic
uncertainty further contributed to a rapid fall in fertility
rates (Johnson, 2007). The move to sub-replacement
fertility in Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic States occurred
rather suddenly in the late 1980s and 1990s. Population
structure has been altered radically due to fertility decline
and emigration. In Ireland we have seen the impacts of
these population movements, with the 2006 Census
recording 63,276 Poles, 24,628 Lithuanians and 13,319
Latvians living in Ireland (CSO, 2007). Whether such
population decline will be reversed will depend on a range
of social, economic and political factors.
Meanwhile, some recent research suggests that the
traditionally low fertility areas of Europe may be starting to
experience a recovery. This work points out that Europe
should not be seen as a single demographic unit, but as two
Europes, one experiencing low fertility and population
decline, while the other is now seeing recovering fertility
and rising population (Rychtarikova, 2005). The first cluster,
the low fertility belt, runs from the Mediterranean to central
and eastern Europe, while the second area of recovering
fertility stretches from France to Scandinavia. One of the
most surprising developments has been in the changing
trends for France, where new projections suggest that the
population will grow by 9 million to 2050. If Germany’s
population continues to fall, this would make France the
most populous country in western Europe. This change is
all the more significant given that France was the first
country in the world which experienced long-term
population decline, beginning in the late eighteenth
century. It is worth noting that Turkey, which is a candidate
country for EU membership, has a very different population
structure to the rest of the EU (see O’Reilly in this issue).
Based on current trends, if Turkey joined the EU it would
become the most populous member state with
correspondingly influential voting rights.
A recent major study on attitudes to demographic change
in Europe has found that, overall, the number of children
being born across Europe does not reflect the number of
children that people actually want. In fact, people would
like to have more children. Reasons which the interviewees
gave for their decision to limit the number of children
included their age, limited financial resources, difficulty in
juggling family and working life and fear of the future
(RTDinfo, 2006). Unfortunately, Ireland was not one of the
14 countries included in the Dialog project.
Parenthood is a particularly difficult role to undertake in a
climate of social insecurity, such as is found in many former
communist countries of central and eastern Europe, which
are experiencing the lowest birth rates in Europe. By
contrast, we have seen that there appears to be some
recovery in fertility in northern European countries. It
seems likely that this is connected to a combination of
positive measures which are in place to enable women to
have the number of children that they would like to have.
Such measures include equal opportunities in the labour
market, family aid policy, tax measures and excellent
childcare facilities. The Dialog project has suggested that a
diverse range of measures to benefit families is needed,
which must form part of a wider policy and which must
meet the desires of the population. For example, in the
post-communist countries, there is a greater need for direct
financial aid to parents. If the correct mix of measures,
including modified tax regimes, childcare facilities, flexible
working hours, education and housing policies, is
introduced, the researchers on the Dialog project believe
that the birth rate across Europe could be boosted by
between 7% and 15% (RTDinfo, 2006). 
Is fertility decline
just about timing?
It has been suggested that the decline in birth rates
represents a temporary shift, as women postpone having
children until later ages. This was thought to be linked to
changes in the timing of marriages or to the fact that
planning births had become easier through contraception.
Certainly, the most recent data for Europe show that the
average age of a European (EU-25) woman on the birth of
her first child is increasing, from 26.1 in 1990 to 27.8 years in
2005. The average age is even higher in Switzerland (29.3
years), Germany (29.0 years) and the Netherlands (28.9
years), while countries such as Denmark, Greece, Ireland,
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Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden are all above the European
average. However, the question remains as to whether
women who have their first child at a later age will ‘catch
up’ or whether the decline in birth rates represents a more
fundamental change in attitudes concerning what
constitutes the ‘right’ family size.
As women delay parenthood, a number of impacts can
emerge. In some cases, having experienced a relatively
independent lifestyle, the social and financial costs of
starting a family become less attractive. As previously
mentioned, improved educational and career
opportunities for women have also provided alternative
trajectories to the traditional role of wife and mother. In
postponing childbirth, furthermore, some women have
found that they have moved beyond their optimum years
of fertility, and discover biological difficulties in becoming
parents. The concept of the ‘biological clock’ is relevant
here. These various factors have resulted in births not just
being postponed, but cancelled.
Demographers have recently tried to allow for the timing
factor in their population projections for Europe. The usual
indicator of the level of fertility in a given calendar year is
the Total Fertility Rate (period TFR). This reflects the
interplay of two components: tempo (timing) and quantum
(level) of fertility. The tempo component affects the TFR
when the timing of childbearing over the life cycle changes.
As we have seen, in Europe many countries are currently
experiencing a postponement of births, which is also
reflected in an increasing average (mean) age of
childbearing. This results in a decline in the number of
births in the current year and therefore depresses the
period TFR, even if the number of children that women will
have over their life course does not change. This timing
effect can be thought of as being an expansion in the
interval between generations during which fewer births fall
into each calendar year. A new indictor has now been
developed which attempts to measure the level (quantum)
of fertility in a given calendar year, excluding the tempo
effect. This is known as the ‘tempo-adjusted TFR’ (For a
detailed description of methods and data see
www.populationeurope.org).
Allowing for the timing factor, population projections using
the Tempo-Adjusted TFR suggest that there may be some
cause for optimism about future fertility patterns in Europe.
As Lutz (2006) shows, in the Czech Republic the TFR fell
sharply after 1992, in tandem with an increase in the mean
age at childbearing. The TFR reached a low of 1.13 children
per woman in 1999 (see Figure 5). However, if the TFR is
adjusted to allow for the ‘tempo effect’, the graph suggests
that most of this drop was due to timing effects linked to
fertility postponement. This means that it is quite likely that
the fertility situation is less extreme than was previously
suggested.
Figure 5: Czech Republic Adjusted TFR
Source: Lutz (2006)
However, in Spain (see Figure 6) the pattern has been quite
different. The adjusted TFR follows the decline in the
conventional TFR, suggesting that women are actually
having fewer children overall, rather than simply delaying
those births to a later age.
Figure 6: Spain Adjusted TFR
Source: Lutz (2006)
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Implications of Europe’s Fertility
Decline: Changing Age
Structures and Future Policies
We have established that Europe has the oldest population
structure in the world due to declines in both fertility and
mortality. The age structure is the outcome of past
population dynamics: past levels of fertility, mortality and
migration. The old-age dependency ratio for the EU-25
currently stands at 0.25 which means that there are four
people in the age group 15-64 (considered as the potential
working age) for each person age 65 or older. No matter
whether fertility decline continues or not, this ratio is bound
to increase significantly over the coming decades because
most of this increase is already pre-programmed in today’s
age structure. There is an 80 percent chance that the ratio
will more than double by 2050, which implies fewer than 2
persons of working age per person above the age of 65.
Concern has been expressed by academics and politicians
alike that Europe’s population trends, combining low fertility,
longer life and mass immigration, will result in huge pressure
on public health, pensions and other social services.
This major shift in the proportions of young and old in the
population has very important implications for many
different social, cultural and political aspects of everyday
life. Recent media attention has focussed on changes to
State pensions and the move towards greater individual
responsibility for pensions. This is because, with more older
people relative to the number of people of working age,
there will be growing economic dependence on a relatively
smaller ‘economically active’ population. For this reason,
discussions have taken place about raising retirement ages.
In Italy, for example, it is currently possible to retire early
from 57 years, but this is now being reconsidered. In 2004,
the minimum pension age in Ireland for public servants,
including teachers, was increased
to 65 and the compulsory
retirement age was removed, so
that in the future public servants
will be able to work to more
advanced ages. Certainly, there are
important questions to be
considered about economic
performance in a future Europe
with a smaller and older
population.
There are many other social and
economic implications of
population ageing, including
poverty, loneliness and changing
consumption patterns (needs for
hospitals and nursing homes rather
than schools). Some strategies to
ensure that older people are
genuinely integrated into society
have been proposed by the
Council of Europe. These include
the abolition of certain practices
such as placing upper age limits on
jobs and having a fixed retirement
age. Instead, it is suggested that
barriers between working life and
non-working life could be removed
by encouraging flexible, rather than
fixed, retirement, and by making
the most of human capital by
encouraging pensioners to take on
Figure 7: Old Age Dependency, 2005
Source: Eurostat, 2007.
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second careers. Already, the elderly make a huge, generally
undervalued, contribution to society by caring for
grandchildren and by working in the voluntary sector in
community organisations, clubs and societies, as well as
through low-paid part-time jobs such as school wardens. In
this era of ‘lifelong learning’, further opportunities should
open up for pensioners.
Given the certainty, built-in to the current population
structure of Europe, that the age-dependency ratio is set to
increase, a number of possible scenarios have emerged. It
has been suggested that economic patterns within the
active population will change. In theory, it is possible that
unemployment could be reduced significantly and
participation of women in the workforce could increase.
Policies which encourage job sharing, flexi-time and
reduced working hours, together with improved and
reasonably-priced childcare provision, could be used to
boost this possibility. More radical suggestions have been
made that migration of workers and their families from
outside Europe should be encouraged, as was the case in
the 1960s when the region experienced a shortage of
workers. For example, one study commissioned in 2007 on
Europe’s Demographic Future found that about 26 million
immigrant workers could be needed by 2050 to
compensate for this decline in the number of people of
working age. However, this is a complex issue which
requires further discussion. Indeed, a report on the
demographic future of Europe by French PSE Member
Françoise Castex will be discussed by MEPs in their
February 2008 plenary session. It is likely to stress the
positive role immigration can play.
Conclusion
It is certain that population ageing will continue, given the
existing population structure. This is bound to put a strain on
health care and pension systems, as discussed above. It
should be noted however, that despite all of the calculations
made by demographers, the future trends of all three forces
(fertility, mortality and migration) shaping the pattern of
population ageing in Europe are uncertain. Furthermore,
policy decisions could go a long way towards alleviating
many of the difficulties created by changing population
structures and might, in some cases, contribute towards a
change in population trends. For example, although
demographic ageing is certainly underway, the actual ratio
of workers to pensioners can also be influenced by policies
affecting labour force participation rates and the retirement
age, especially female participation, linked to provision of
childcare. Other policies may help to encourage the upward
trend in fertility which is being experienced in the northern
and western parts of Europe, perhaps causing it to be
extended into southern and eastern Europe.
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APPENDIX: INTERNET
RESOURCES FOR POPULATION
IN THE CLASSROOM
The dynamic nature of population can make it difficult to
keep pace with changes. Fortunately, the advent of Internet
resources enables us to access the most up-to-date data,
thereby refreshing our teaching and keeping it relevant. One
extremely useful resource is the World Population Data
Sheet (WPDS), which is published annually by the
Population Reference Bureau, a Washington-based
organisation which aims provide accurate, easy-to-
understand and unbiased information about issues related
to population, health, and the environment. The WPDS,
which can be accessed online free of charge, provides a
range of demographic data for the world as a whole, for
more and less developed regions, for each continent, sub-
region and country. For example, the data drawn upon in this
article refer to Europe as a whole, to four sub-regions
(Northern, Western, Eastern and Southern Europe) and to
individual countries within Europe. The World Population
Data Sheet can be downloaded from the Population
Reference Bureau website at www.prb.org, along with many
other useful articles and resources.
European Demographic Data Sheet 2006: available for
download here:
www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/popeurope/download.shtml or from
www.populationeurope.org. The data sheet provides 26
indicators, which range from life expectancy at birth to
average retirement ages and net migration totals, for 46
European countries.
Eurostat is the Statistical Office of the European
Communities, established in 1953. It gathers and analyses
figures from the different European statistics offices in order
to provide comparable and harmonised data to the
European Institutions so that they can define, implement
and analyse Community policies. The data available cover
the European Union, its Member States and its partners, and
are published under a variety of Themes and Collections:
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat. Incidentally, it is worth
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noting that the European Foundation for the Improvement
of Living and Working Conditions is based in Loughlinstown,
Dublin (http://www.eurofound.europa.eu). 
US Census Bureau’s International Data Base provides
population pyramids for every country in the world:
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/ 
Animated discussion of creation of population pyramid and
its current structure for France, produced by l'Institut
national d'études démographiques (INED), see
http://www.ined.fr/en/everything_about_population/an
imations/age_pyramid/ (suitable for Junior Certificate
level)
United Nations Programme on Ageing:
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/ageing/popageing.html 
Learn more about the Dialog - Population Policy
Acceptance Study (PPAS) project at: http://www.bib-
demographie.de/ppa/IndexDialogStart.htm. 
Create a population pyramid with Excel using the simple
steps outlined on this website: http://www-agecon.ag.ohio-
state.edu/class/aede597.01/gonzalez/pyramid/pyramid.
html 
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